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Abstract 
Corporate knowledge is considered a crucial determinant of sustainable competitive 
advantage. Recent resource-leveraging strategies emphasize inter-firm collaboration 
and knowledge sharing across firm boundaries, however. This strategic paradox of 
protecting versus sharing knowledge suggests the need for new paradigms that 
reconcile intra- and inter-organizational knowledge sharing. Building on 
organizational collaboration and control theory, this paper investigates contingencies 
of inter-organizational knowledge sharing and proposes four configurations of inter-
organizational knowledge sharing for managing the paradox. It concludes with a 
critical review, suggestions for further conceptual and empirical research, and 
implications for research and practice. 
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1 Introduction 
A resource-based view of strategic management emphasizes a firm’s need for unique, internal 
resources and competencies (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Shenkar and Li, 1999; Weick and 
Westley, 1996). Here, corporate competencies and capabilities – in particular knowledge 
resources – enable sustainable dynamic adaptation and competitive advantage (Gomes and 
Dahab, 2010; Spender, 1998). Since Penrose (1995), the resource-based view has emphasized the 
role of knowledge as a vital enabler of competitive differentiation. Matusik and Hill (1998, p. 
683) state that “firms increasingly rely on building and creating knowledge as a necessary 
condition to survive”.  
While the resource-based view relies on firm heterogeneity (Felin and Hesterly, 2007), 
knowledge sharing is an action that is likely to reduce such heterogeneity given that “even small, 
incremental knowledge can distinguish an organization from its competitors” (Cohen, 1998, p. 
23). As a result, academics have been investigating knowledge sharing processes across 
organizational boundaries in recent years (Gerlach et al., 2015; Loebbecke et al., 1999; Newell, 
2015; Verdecho et al., 2006). Increasingly, firms’ competitive advantage depends on co-operating 
with partners and sharing resources (Foss et al., 2010) – a phenomenon that has been referred to 
as the extended resource-based view of the firm (Caldwell and Howard, 2010). 
Knowledge sharing has been defined as “the transfer of useful know-how or information across 
company lines” (Appleyard, 1996, p. 138). Research on inter-firm knowledge sharing recognizes 
that firms are involved in multiple temporal or more permanent agreements for co-operation 
(Chang and Gurbaxani, 2012; Jones and Lichtenstein, 2008; Marabelli and Newell, 2012; 
Zimmermann and Ravishankar, 2014). It assesses the strategic implications of a firm’s 
knowledge-involved interactions with its direct environment (Reve, 1990). Enabled by the 
emergence of advanced information and communication technologies, co-operation between 
firms on the same horizontal level in an industry, even amongst those without prior long-term 
relationships, has become common (Feller et al., 2013; Hardy et al., 2003). Moreover, vertical co-
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operation between customers and vendors has changed the organization of supply chains (Rollins 
et al., 2011). 
Yet inter-organizational knowledge sharing confronts firms with a paradox of dealing with 
contradictory requirements (Hamel et al., 1989; Smith and Lewis, 2011; van Fenema and 
Loebbecke, 2014). On the one hand, it may enhance total value-added as firms can translate 
unique, scarcely accessible resources from their partners into new business opportunities. On the 
other, it may affect the uniqueness and thus competitive contribution of a firm’s knowledge 
repository. Hence, a potential conflict in the context of collaboration between competitors under 
‘co-opetition’ arises (Gnyawali and Park, 2011; Wiener and Saunders, 2014; Young et al., 2012). 
Although there is increasing competitive advantage from joint learning, firms also need to secure 
their own competitive advantage (Gnyawali and Park, 2011). Up on this, current research has 
elaborated on inter-organizational knowledge sharing from a strategic and social perspective (e.g., 
Abou-Zeid, 2005; Salvetat et al., 2013); yet it pays little attention to addressing the competitive 
paradox of inter-organizational knowledge sharing to reap the benefits of cooperating without 
losing one’s own advantage. 
The objective of this conceptual paper is to unpack the ability to balance inter-firm knowledge 
sharing as a challenge of co-ordinating and controlling the behaviors of people within an 
organization, while co-ordinating and controlling knowledge sharing between organizations. 
Thus, the paper investigates inter-firm collaboration involving knowledge with assumed 
operational and business value beyond the context of any co-operative agreement. Instead of 
collaboration resulting in ‘asset specificity’ (Williamson, 1985), the focus is on the inverse 
situation of making assets more generally available. The paper assumes that both parties can 
translate collaborative knowledge into adjacent or overlapping business capabilities and hence 
exploit additional opportunities beyond the collaboration. It suggests partially diverging interests 
between collaborating partners that trigger political as well as operational processes (Child and 
Rodrigues, 2011). 
Moreover, the paper offers insight into the contingencies pertaining to knowledge sharing related 
to co-ordination and control mechanisms (Vlaar et al., 2006). These mechanisms extend to both 
intra- and inter-organizational knowledge sharing challenges. This work thus complements and 
extends the knowledge-based theory of the firm. It stresses, on the one hand, coordination of 
knowledge practices within organizational boundaries and, on the other, the complexity of inter-
organizational knowledge sharing. Taken together, this approach contributes to the understanding 
of the paradoxical requirements of intra- and inter-organizational knowledge sharing. 
The paper is organized as follows. It first investigates three contingency dimensions of inter-
organizational knowledge sharing: types of knowledge (tacit and explicit), mode of knowledge 
sharing (unilateral or bilateral), and dynamics of knowledge sharing (intended and actual). 
Acknowledging the difference between sharing intention and actual sharing outcome, the paper 
subsequently focusses on inter- and intra-organizational co-ordination and control processes and 
their implications of four configurations of inter-organizational knowledge sharing. It concludes 
with implications for practice and for research. 
 
2 Inter-Organizational Knowledge Sharing 
Sharing knowledge across organizational boundaries has been studied in domains as diverse as 
new product development and software projects (Heisig, 2009; Majchrzak et al., 2005; Malhotra 
et al., 2001; Peng et al., 2013; Popovic et al., 2014; Vlaar et al., 2008). These studies tend to 
 3 
focus on micro-level organizational practices such as interpersonal interactions, team-based 
structures, network ties, business intelligence, and challenges of remote communications. 
However, knowledge sharing represents a process at this micro-, but also at the meso-
organizational and inter-organizational level (Lepak et al., 2007; Loebbecke et al., 1999; Shollo 
and Galliers, 2015). It translates micro practices constituting knowledge sharing into a 
phenomenon with strategic implications. To conceptualize this knowledge sharing, the paper 
distinguishes three dimensions of contingency: the types of knowledge, the direction of 
knowledge sharing, and the dynamics of knowledge sharing. 
 
2.1 Knowledge Types 
This research pursues Grant’s (1996b) suggestion of focusing on types of knowledge, their 
inherent characteristics, and their respective managerial consequences. Especially the distinction 
between explicit and tacit knowledge has influenced conceptual and empirical research on 
strategic and organizational knowledge management (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995, von Krogh, 2009; von Krogh et al., 2001). 
 
Knowledge is commonly distinguished as explicit or tacit (Berry
, 
and Broadbent, 1988; Nonaka, 
1991; Polanyi, 1967). Explicit knowledge refers to concepts, information and insights that are 
specifiable and can be formalized in rules and procedures (Walsh and Dewar, 1987). Access, 
storage and transfer of this knowledge are achieved by corporate documents and information 
systems such as databases. For Dyer and Singh (1998) explicit knowledge may just be 
information. For Cohen (1998), knowledge is information in context, with information being 
subsumed into knowledge, considering it a form of explicit, formalized knowledge. Examples of 
explicit knowledge include detailed engineering specifications for software development or 
product manufacturing. 
 
Implicit or tacit knowledge refers to less specifiable insights and skills that are ‘embedded’ in 
individuals or an organizational context (Weick and Westley, 1996). It is associated with 
experience and may be about ‘human asset specificity’. Employees develop and refine 
collectively routines to achieve organizational adaptation and learning (Nelson and Winter, 
1982). March and Simon (1958, p. 142) refer to ‘programs’ to describe these routines: “Most 
programs are stored in the minds of the employees who carry them out, or in the minds of 
superiors, subordinates, or associates. For many purposes, the simplest and most accurate way to 
discover what a person does is to ask him.” Understanding and transferring this type of 
knowledge depends on direct participation and inclusion in the context where it resides (Tyre and 
von Hippel, 1997). Researchers refer to this phenomenon as ‘stickiness’ (e.g., Szulanski, 1996) 
and point to the arduous process of explaining tacit knowledge (Grant, 1996a). 
 
In terms of integrating knowledge types into a typology of knowledge, James et al. (2013) 
distinguish between individual and collective knowledge (see also von Krogh 2009), between 
private and public knowledge (i.e., differentiating the owner of knowledge), component 
knowledge (knowing about work elements) and architectural knowledge (knowing about a 
complete process), as well as between tacit and explicit knowledge, without any knowledge type 
having exclusive characteristic. Architectural knowledge, for example, is considered as private, 
collective, and tacit.  
 4 
Von Krogh (2012), and similarly Hislop (2013), contend that explicit and tacit (implicit) 
knowledge can further be dichotomized into individual and social knowledge. Von Krogh argues 
that the resulting four types – conscious, automatic, objectified and collective – may each need a 
different theory of firm use.  
In order to differentiate between knowledge types, this paper adopts and extends Matusik and 
Hills’ (1998) knowledge typology (Figure 1). Starting with the distinction between private 
(organization-specific) and public knowledge, the typology then builds on the distinctions 
between component versus architectural knowledge, individual versus collective knowledge, and 
tacit versus explicit knowledge. According to Matusik and Hill (1998), private knowledge 
includes component knowledge (discrete) and architectural knowledge (systemic). Component 
knowledge can reside in individuals or collectives. Architectural knowledge is likely to be 
distributed over a collective. The tacit/explicit sub-divisions of private knowledge display the 
characteristics of automatic, conscious, collective and objective. Such mappings are not one-to-
one, but ought to assist in understanding the general characteristics of knowledge and the 
management contingencies that may be applied to each. Public knowledge is essentially property-
based and discrete. It concerns component knowledge (not architectural knowledge) and resides 
in individuals. Explicit public knowledge has ‘conscious’ features while tacit public knowledge is 
automatic (see also Spender 1998, 1996). Private knowledge is more likely to be knowledge-
based than property-based. Overall, this extended typology of Matusik and Hill (1998) 
encompasses seven knowledge categories and provides a starting point for assessing knowledge 
sharing contingencies. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Knowledge Typology, after Matusik and Hill (1998) 
 
 
2.2 Mode of Inter-Organizational Knowledge Sharing 
Knowledge sharing may be unilateral and take the characteristics of one-way traffic. For 
example, in an outsourcing agreement, clients share knowledge with their vendors to enable 
delivery of the product or service (Ko et al., 2005; Oshri et al., 2015). This does not necessarily 
mean that vendors will share their knowledge with clients, however. Unilateral knowledge 
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sharing typically occurs in organizations such as market researchers or news agencies whose 
business is selling knowledge and expertise. In other cases the underlying logic of collaboration 
suggests bilateral or reciprocal knowledge sharing (Vlaar et al., 2008). Reciprocal knowledge 
sharing is a principal determinant for reaping the anticipated benefits of co-operation synergies 
such as taking advantage of complementary knowledge and for creating knowledge 
synergistically. An example is the collaboration of R&D units involving joint investments of 
firms in development and manufacturing facilities. 
On an operational level, unilateral and bilateral knowledge sharing are associated with different 
types of workflow inter-dependencies (Jasimuddin et al., 2012; Thompson, 1967). Unilateral 
knowledge sharing is of a pooled or sequential nature; it comprises steps of identifying and 
transferring, in a single direction, prior agreed-upon knowledge and information. However, 
pooled interdependence might be better thought of as indirect, bilateral sharing drawing from the 
same common pool. Bilateral knowledge sharing causes more complicated work-sharing 
arrangements, which require inter-firm taskforces of professionals to elaborate and control 
knowledge exchanges. 
 
2.3 Strategic Dynamics of Inter-Organizational Knowledge Sharing 
Researchers (e.g., Dekker and van den Abbeele, 2010; Spencer, 2003) point to the dynamic nature 
of inter-organizational knowledge sharing as organizations adopt a variety of strategies, such as 
collaboration, competition, compromise, accommodation and avoidance (Jasimuddin et al., 2012; 
Larsson et al., 1998). This paper differentiates between two dynamics of inter-organizational 
knowledge sharing: (1) enlarging knowledge sharing beyond formalized agreements, and (2) 
changing the mode of knowledge sharing from unilateral to bilateral and vice versa. 
 
Enlarging knowledge sharing beyond formalized agreements. Access to partners’ knowledge 
repositories is a tempting opportunity to collect knowledge in excess of agreed-upon boundaries 
as defined in the contract. This may include collecting more knowledge of the same type parties 
had formalized or extracting a different type of knowledge – for example, tacit knowledge on top 
of the contractually justifiable and specified explicit knowledge. Here, the potential discrepancy 
between actual and intended knowledge sharing depends on the type of knowledge shared 
(Davison et al. 2013). Objectified and conscious (i.e., explicit individual or collective) knowledge 
can be more easily bounded than automatic and collective (tacit individual or collective) 
knowledge. 
 
Changing the mode of knowledge sharing from unilateral to bilateral and vice versa. In instances 
of knowledge sharing, there will be countervailing forces. Firms that are engaged in unilateral 
knowledge sharing may try to make sharing bilateral, while those engaged in bilateral exchanges 
may be motivated to make the sharing unilateral (Figure 2).  
Based on an organization’s capability to integrate knowledge (Grant, 1996a), firms that are 
engaged in unilateral knowledge sharing attempt to maximize the process of absorbing 
information and developing internally unique know-how, while minimizing knowledge leakage 
into their direct environment. Over time, they may be motivated to make sharing bilateral so that 
they gain knowledge beyond the original agreement. From a co-ordination and workflow theory 
perspective, most outsourcing agreements suggest a unilateral type of workflow. However, the 
sustainability of this type of knowledge flow is contingent upon the client’s need to adapt 
business and operational processes to changes in technologies or market developments. This, in 
 6 
turn, may trigger bilateral knowledge sharing to adjust performances and expectations mutually 
(Marabelli and Newell, 2012; Thompson, 1967). Conversely, firms may formally agree upon 
collaboration and bilateral information sharing. This could underpin an agreement to engage in 
inter-organizational R&D collaboration (van de Ven, 2005). Divergent interests may nevertheless 
trigger attempts organizations on both sides to restrict the mutual knowledge sharing to unilateral 
inputs in order to retain as much of one’s knowledge as one can while still fulfilling the contract. 
The resulting asymmetry could strengthen the organization’s competitive position. 
 
 
Figure 2. Intended versus actual unilateral and bilateral inter-organizational knowledge sharing 
 
3 Co-ordination and control mechanism to tackle the knowledge sharing paradox 
Research on strategic knowledge management has predominantly focused on cognitive processes 
within the firm boundaries, such as the conversion of tacit into explicit knowledge, the creation of 
knowledge, and the knowledge transfer and integration (e.g., Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; 
Snyman and Kruger, 2004). Sharing knowledge across organizational boundaries shifts the focus 
– in addition to close inter-firm contact, relational contracting and trust building (Powell, 1996) – 
onto co-ordination and control mechanisms to deal with the paradox of sharing and protecting 
knowledge (Gupta and Polonsky, 2013; Smith and Lewis, 2011; Trkman and Desouza, 2012; van 
Fenema and Loebbecke, 2014).  
Following Caker (2008), this research applies four types of co-ordination and control mechanisms 
– structural, procedural, technical, or social – to inter-organizational knowledge sharing. These 
form part of what Lorenzoni and Lipparini (1999) term the architecture of inter-firm governance 
mechanisms. Each mechanism has a role to play in coordinating and controlling the paradoxical 
challenge of inter-organizational knowledge sharing. While interacting and not mutually 
exclusive, their usefulness for different type of knowledge exchange varies. Whilst explicit 
knowledge exchange is based mainly on procedure and structure, social co-ordination comes to 
the fore in tacit knowledge sharing. The sophistication of the technical co-ordination available 
especially modifies the roles of the other co-ordination types by allowing more, rapid, detailed, 
interactive communication across time and geography. Further, technical control can have a 
surveillance effect substituting for other coordination mechanisms (Jain and Thietart, 2013).  
 Structural co-ordination and control is beneficial when there is increased risk of 
opportunistic behavior (i.e., where Williamson (1990) proposes hierarchy instead of markets 
or contracts). Further, intermediate (between intra- and inter-organizational) forms like joint 
ventures might be appropriate. The mechanism relies on hierarchy, team structure and liaison; 
it is neither useful for the exchange of tacit knowledge as this is embedded and transfer relies 
Types of knowledge flows
Example
Manufacturing 
outsourcing
R&D collaboration
Intended direction of 
knowledge flows
Actual direction of 
knowledge flows
Unilateral Bilateral
Bilateral Unilateral
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on experience, nor is it fruitful for knowledge that is held by an individual or that is 
architectural (Carlile, 2004). 
 Procedural co-ordination and control, including standards and contracts, is appropriate for 
explicit, specifiable knowledge, which allows for specifying and limiting what knowledge 
might be exchanged. This mechanism includes commitment to professional standards for 
dealing with sensitive information. However, as it does not guarantee conformance. It may 
cause a control problem betweenorganizations unless the contract provides insufficient 
remedy for post-project opportunistic behavior (Sobrero and Schrader, 1998). According to 
Williamson (1990), control between organizations is more difficult than within organizations. 
 Technical co-ordination and control applies if the knowledge is put in systems which grant 
different levels of controlled access. Researchers have elaborated on technologies and related 
organizational mechanisms to manage risks (Majchrzak and Jarvenpaa, 2010; Marabelli and 
Newell, 2012). The mechanism appears to have the same characteristics as procedural co-
ordination. It is useful for explicit, public, private and component knowledge, but unlikely to 
facilitate the management of the other knowledge types. 
 Social co-ordination and control may take the form of relational contracting, personal 
relationships, team working and trust building. The mechanism is likely to be used at some 
level for any knowledge exchange involving direct human interaction. Extensive use of this 
mechanism, though, will always be costly, and might conflict with the temporal aspect of 
cooperation. Ensuring mutually beneficial inter-organizational knowledge sharing requires 
close inter-firm contact, relational contracting and trust building (Powell, 1996; Sobrero and 
Schrader, 1998). 
Overall, while structural, technical and procedural mechanisms can be employed for explicit, 
component, public and private knowledge, all dominant knowledge types require some level of 
social coordination and control. Such inter-personal interaction is more likely to result in 
unintended knowledge sharing than any of the other mechanisms. Hence, when organizations 
seek to manage paradoxical requirements of sharing knowledge in a balanced manner, unintended 
sharing jeopardizes the achievement of such a balance – and, ultimately, unintended knowledge 
sharing could jeopardize firm interests. 
The paper has, thus far, identified the types of knowledge that firms may need to share, it has 
acknowledged the modes of inter-organizational knowledge sharing, and the dynamics of that 
sharing. Given these, this section focused on co-ordination and control mechanisms for sharing 
knowledge and identified the sharing ‘paradox’. The next section seeks to integrate these by 
understanding the contingent nature of the configurations of inter-firm knowledge sharing. 
 
4 Configurations of Inter-Organizational Knowledge Sharing 
Contingency theory seeks to explain variations in the structuring of organizations and their 
performance by the characteristics of the task technology and environment (Pennings, 1992). Co-
ordination and control theory has been structured by a contingency perspective. The common 
notion of ‘knowledge work’ refers to tasks being non-routine, cognitive, and interdependent 
(Purser and Montuori, 1995). Hence, researching the co-ordination and control of such tasks 
suggests adopting task contingencies that reflect the knowledge characteristics, here tacit and 
explicit. The inter-firm dimension of work-flows suggest a focus on two types of co-ordination 
and control mechanisms depending on their focus on unilateral or bilateral knowledge sharing 
(Gittell and Weiss, 2004). 
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Table 1 applies unilateral and bilateral knowledge sharing to explicit and tacit knowledge and 
results in four configurations of inter-organizational knowledge sharing. This section now 
elaborates on each configuration in light of the two strategic dynamics of inter-organizational 
knowledge sharing. 
 
Table 1. Configurations of Inter-Organizational Knowledge Sharing 
 Unilateral knowledge sharing Bilateral knowledge sharing 
Tacit knowledge Outsourcing strategies:  
Client-supplier software specifications 
Exchange of complementary market 
research information between 
competitors 
Explicit knowledge Client-supplier nexus 
in automotive industry 
Collaboration of R&D units in 
semi-conductor industry 
 
4.1 Unilateral Sharing of Explicit Knowledge 
Unilateral sharing of explicit knowledge is most likely in vendor-client situations that involve 
paying for a specific good or service. Paradoxical requirements concentrate on the unilaterally 
sharing organization giving more than required for its own value. In a strategy aimed at 
concentrating and nurturing core competencies, firms increasingly outsource peripheral business 
services like IT projects, marketing, and investment management (Dedrick and Kraemer, 2010; 
Trusson et al., 2014). Vendor firms need corporate knowledge and information to provide 
services. Client firms will allow vendors to pull from their know-how repository to the extent that 
this is a prerequisite for executing outsourcing services. 
The explicit character of shared knowledge allows for detailed and comprehensive description, 
codification and formalization of unilateral inter-firm knowledge sharing. Explicit knowledge is 
most easily protected by law. This results in transparency for both firms as to (1) which 
knowledge will (not) be shared, and (2) how the transfer process will be organized (Liu and Aron, 
2014.). The former refers to the completeness of the contract and facilitates internal guidelines 
and task assignments to collect and prepare the knowledge for sharing (Leidner, 2010). The latter 
makes it possible to define the transfer modes and planning. The articulated character of the 
knowledge enables transfer modes with low information processing capacity, such as document 
hand-overs or limited access to corporate databases (Carlile, 2004) - that is, technical co-
ordination. 
Considering the issue of enlarging knowledge sharing beyond formalized agreements, vendors 
focused on a particular industry that serve clients that compete with one another may build 
increasingly sophisticated industry-specific knowledge and use it synergistically in their network. 
If a client’s knowledge is leveraged to the vendor’s clientele, it becomes a commonly-shared 
good and may lose its uniqueness (and thereby perhaps becoming public knowledge). Second, 
vendors may collect industry specific know-how to strengthen their competitive position. This 
may enable a strategy of bypassing clients and entering their markets. Client firms may attempt to 
trigger knowledge sharing in the opposite direction by requiring vendors to display their internal 
competencies. Incorporation of this know-how decreases the uniqueness of the vendor's 
performance and hence its competitive position. 
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4.2 Bilateral Sharing of Explicit Knowledge 
A presence in, and knowledge of, local markets often differs between firms that otherwise have 
comparable R&D and marketing competencies. In order to enable both firms to leverage their 
competencies, exchange of such complementary local knowledge often appears to be a viable 
strategy. This may trigger a process of exchanging, for example, marketing and sales information, 
knowledge of local business opportunities and economic developments, and information on 
quality procedures, factory operations, IT or business models, and product or process designs 
(Hevner et al., 2010), as well as regulatory requirements. Both organizations face a quid pro quo 
balancing act of sharing and receiving knowledge. They strive for extensions to their competitive 
advantage without diluting their unique resources. The explicitness of knowledge allows for 
similar strategies as those outlined in the previous section. That is, comprehensive contracts 
specify the contents and procedures for knowledge transfer. Internally, explicit guidelines and 
task partitioning define the organizational expectations for collecting and formatting the 
transferable know-how. Reciprocity of knowledge sharing provides for a more complicated 
knowledge transfer process. The collaborative agreement stresses the reciprocity and equivalence 
of firms’ expected performances. However, in practice, each partner may be tempted to 
unilaterally enhance the added value from the cooperation (Loebbecke et al., 1999). This 
comprises strategies aimed at decreasing the amount and value of the information that an 
organization shares. In addition, from a recipient’s point of view, it suggests attempts to increase 
the amount and value of incoming sharing. For example, a firm may ask for clarifications and 
additional contextual information beyond the knowledge sharing covered by the formalized 
agreement. 
The reciprocal character of bilateral knowledge sharing implies adaptations of co-ordination and 
control mechanisms; the contract not only comprises specifications for managing unilateral 
knowledge sharing. In addition, the quid pro quo character suggests interdependence between the 
work sharing and thus exacerbates the needs for co-ordination (Crowston, 1997). Contracts will 
therefore contain stipulations defining the modes of intertwining knowledge exchange and 
mutually dependent planning of intermediate deliveries. In practice, the reciprocal dependence 
necessitates frequent meetings between firm representatives to provide feedback and mutually to 
adjust corporate performances (van de Ven and Delbecq, 1976). Even with explicit knowledge, 
social mechanisms are required to complement bureaucratic and contractual mechanisms (Vlaar 
et al., 2006). Internally, the contractual clauses are complemented by, and translated into, 
bureaucratic guidelines (Jaeger and Baliga, 1985).  
 
4.3 Unilateral Sharing of Tacit Knowledge 
This section analyses the unilateral adaptive behavior of a supplier to the client’s processes. This 
induces the client to share knowledge that is intricate, contextual and tacit, enabling adjustment 
and integration of the supplier’s business and operational processes. The fine line of sharing 
sufficiently, but not too much, becomes ambiguous and uncertain - and hence, difficult to 
manage.  
It may be that the ‘supplier’ and ‘client’ are both members of a joint venture, but the knowledge 
flow is unilateral as often happens in relationships between dominant customers and small firms 
(Levy et al., 1999; Oxley and Wada, 2009). The tacit dimension of unilateral inter-firm work 
sharing provides for ambiguity and uncertainty. Consequently, firms are limited in their capacity 
to specify and contractually formalize reciprocal behaviors considered appropriate versus those 
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deemed illegitimate. This means that the transfer of the supplier’s contextual knowledge requires 
frequent face-to-face interaction between supplier and client personnel (von Hippel, 1994). 
Interfirm workflow characteristics amplify the strategic dynamics. The supplier’s legitimate 
access to tacit knowledge sustains gaining in-depth understanding of the client’s competencies 
and integrative capabilities (Grant, 1996b). If the supplier has connections to firms competing 
with the client organization, this access becomes somewhat undesirable. The supplier may then 
share, leverage or even sell their understanding to these competing firms. For the supplier, this is 
a tempting option as tacit knowledge is assumed to provide more intricate and, thus, valuable 
information. Alternatively, under the guise of a temporary role as supplier, a firm can copy 
clients’ competencies and subsequently intrude on their market (Hamel et al., 1989). In turn, 
clients may attempt to modify the knowledge flow from unilateral to bilateral or vice versa and 
trigger opposite sharing of know-how from their suppliers. Reciprocal sharing enables them to 
decrease the uniqueness of the client’s competencies and invade the supplier’s business. 
Reputation effects may act as a counter to the temptation to enlarge knowledge sharing, however. 
Both sources of strategic dynamics suggest exacerbated and specific needs for co-ordination and 
control modes. But the goal is to achieve a balance in the paradoxical requirements of knowledge 
sharing and knowledge protecting. Contextual, non-articulable knowledge provides for 
transaction uncertainty and is, therefore, probably not contractable in a comprehensive manner 
(Williamson, 1991). Informal safeguards take much longer to establish and operate effectively. 
Several strategies are at the client’s disposal to co-ordinate and control this exchange process and 
hedge for undesirable dynamics. The clients can limit the time and connections for supplier 
personnel in collecting the knowledge they need. Further, they can manage the partially-internal 
process of collecting and transferring tacit knowledge, that is centralize know-how handovers by 
assigning formal gatekeepers. For the supplier, those liaisons provide an exclusive gateway to 
corporate knowledge. For internal personnel, they are the focal point for collecting knowledge 
and managing the transfer process. 
 
4.4 Bilateral Sharing of Tacit Knowledge 
The analysis in this section focuses on tacit, reciprocal knowledge sharing between firms. The 
strategic dynamics of bilateral tacit knowledge sharing concern the ‘equality’ of knowledge 
sharing. An assumption is that firms equally participate in, and contribute to, a co-operative 
agreement with respect to, for example, the quality and added value of know-how. However, the 
leveragability of the information being shared and firms’ partially conflicting interests may tempt 
them to deviate from the initial agreement. Tensions easily arise, with the potential of escalating 
uncertainty and distrust (Hsu and Chang, 2014; Lewis, 2000). Examples are strategies to deliver 
limited and possibly inaccurate information, combined with enhancing the reception of valuable 
knowledge, that is effective intra-organizational knowledge strategies. 
Managing the cost/benefit dynamics  is hampered by the tacitness and reciprocity of knowledge 
exchange. The former impedes – as indicated – ex ante specification of the know-how content 
and procedure for transferring. Implications of the latter are more complicated. Reciprocity of 
work-sharing necessitates intensive interdependence and interaction between professionals from 
both firms. To sustain these increased information processing needs, prior research proposes 
group modes of coordinating work (e.g., van de Ven and Delbecq, 1976). In practice, partners 
will organize inter-firm task forces or project teams to foster synergetic knowledge exchange and 
creation (Majchrzak and Jarvenpaa, 2010). Firms would like to be able to specify task force 
membership from all parties. The first ‘battle-ground’ is in the choice of individuals to put into 
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inter-organizational teams, since project team members will import and export both public and 
private knowledge. Firms might best view task force members, both from their partner 
organizations and from their own, as contingent workers. Matusik and Hill (1998) analyze the 
management of contingent workers so as to maximize knowledge creation. Firms need to limit 
the ability of contingent workers leaking private knowledge into the public domain. Matusik and 
Hill (1998) suggest that knowledge gains from contingent workers is maximized by picking 
contingent workers with strong public knowledge, by the firm striving to integrate the knowledge, 
perceiving it as useful, motivating contingent workers to transfer knowledge and ‘home’ workers 
to be receptive, and focusing on the firm’s knowledge absorption capabilities. Yet, any attempt to 
introduce knowledge protection mechanisms into the firm is likely to impede communication and 
any infrastructural changes to protect knowledge are likely to become rapidly obsolete 
(Liebeskind, 1996).  
In order to make teams work effectively, subsequent stages of socialization and interpersonal 
contacts are required (Katzenbach and Smith, 1993). These dynamics should yield strong feelings 
of collegiality and commitment to the group’s functioning (McGrath, 1994). Such a context 
induces team members to share their know-how as a mode for reciprocally co-ordinating 
teamwork. From the firm’s perspective, however, a different rationality may prevail. Team-
centered commitments may conflict with the interests of the firms. Apart from commitments, the 
connection between project members working in inter-organizational teams and their firm also 
features issues related to knowledge sharing. 
Taken together, this configuration provides for a complicated co-ordination and control context in 
the sense of co-operating organizations failing to balance their paradoxical requirements. 
Formalized contractual agreements and internal corporate task-based controls seem to cover little 
know-how content and few transfer procedures, as formal co-ordination modes cannot 
comprehensively capture the mutual contingencies introduced by reciprocal task interdependence 
(McCann and Galbraith, 1981). Hence, the inevitably incomplete contractual statements and 
internal bureaucratic procedures must be complemented with people-based strategies. 
This section has identified four configurations of knowledge sharing between firms and the 
contingencies involved thereof. The final section of this paper seeks to draw together the threads 
of this research. 
 
5 Discussion, Conclusions and Implications 
Managing knowledge and information processes plays an increasingly prominent role in 
achieving sustainable competitive advantage. For three decades, strategic management and 
organization theory reflect on the necessity to develop and apply novel, integrative conceptual 
perspectives (e.g., Grant, 1996b). In conjunction with conceptualizations on intra-organizational 
knowledge processes (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Szulanski, 1996), scholars have started to 
explore the intricacies of managing knowledge sharing among firms (Lia et al., 2006; Loebbecke 
et al., 1999; Wiener and Saunders, 2014; Yaoa et al., 2007). This paper contributes to this work 
by elaborating on two contingencies of managing inter-firm knowledge sharing: (1) the type of 
knowledge firms share (explicit or tacit) and (2) the mode of knowledge sharing between 
organizations (unilateral or bilateral). These contingencies yield four configurations of knowledge 
sharing. Derived from insights in the coordination and control literature, this work proposes 
management approaches geared to address the four configurations.  
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The configurations and management approaches of inter-organizational knowledge sharing offer a 
useful contribution to practitioners and academics.. They provide professionals involved in 
business processes or projects crossing their organization’s boundaries with insights and 
guidelines to manage and anticipate opportunities and pitfalls. Based on an assessment of the type 
and direction of knowledge sharing, they can develop, implement, and fine-tune intra-, and 
especially inter-organizational, co-ordination and control modes. From an academic perspective, 
analyzing the four configurations suggests a role for externally-oriented corporate competencies 
that complement more internally-oriented competencies aimed at the transfer, integration and 
creation of knowledge (Kale et al., 2002; Szulanski, 1996). Extending the current literature on 
inter-organizational knowledge sharing, the analysis shows that – even with explicit knowledge – 
co-ordination and control challenges will arise beyond mere codification and bureaucratic, or 
contractual, control (Dekker, 2004; Hadaya and Cassivi, 2012).  
Firms involved in inter-firm knowledge sharing need to develop capabilities and routines to 
understand and handle complex knowledge sharing across their boundaries. This will result in 
opportunities for further research in the context of strategic information systems (IS). For 
instance, by distinguishing the seven knowledge types shown in Figure 1, it is possible to 
conjecture IS requirements to adequately support inter-organizational knowledge sharing efforts 
or a ranking of the costs at which knowledge may be shared. Moreover, the relative size and 
power of co-operating organizations as well as an analysis of complementary outsourcing 
arrangements warrant further investigation. Extending research into large organizations 
acquisition of smaller firms (Puranam et al., 2006), size and power may influence the mode 
(unilateral or bilateral) of knowledge sharing and the requisite co-ordination and control 
mechanisms. 
As in any effort of contributing to theory building, limitations need to be taken into account. For 
instance, reading the knowledge typology (Figure 1), it is clear that, in practice, most knowledge 
cannot be compartmentalized into discrete categories; it will span a number of dimensions. Thus, 
the interest is in the dominant characteristics of any piece of knowledge so as to allow 
investigation of the associated coordination and control aspects. The paper recognizes the 
limitations of suggesting such a rather fine granularity when it comes to developing practical 
implications. Similarly, the set of contingencies and the resulting large number of possible 
configurations (four of which are investigated here) necessarily lead to fine distinctions in 
management strategies, which are difficult to implement as such in practice. This should not 
constrain researchers from demonstrating the full spectrum and then applying themselves to the 
task of developing meaningful and implementable aggregations. 
In order to bridge between the various theoretical research contributions and the real world, the 
paper concludes – in line with scholars from adjacent research foci and disciplines (Galliers et al., 
2012; Peppard et al., 2014; Whittington, 2014) – with a plea for insights into challenges and 
opportunities in the field of inter-organizational knowledge sharing on practical projects and 
implementations. As a start, and as an impetus to further endeavors, this paper provides the 
beginnings of a theory of managing inter-firm knowledge sharing. The next stages require: further 
refinement of the conceptual model and extension and integration with related theories such as 
economic theories, recent developments in organization theory such as complexity theory, 
strategic management theories, and by no means last, IS and social media theories. In parallel, 
empirical research may start to investigate a set of hypotheses based on the configuration theory 
outlined in this paper. This may include survey-type of research based on for instance inter-
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organizational cooperation in a particular industry or associated with an institutional field. Case 
study research could focus on (transitions between) particular configurations in dyadic or multi-
party cooperation.  
 
!!!PP: please help?!!!  
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